Parametric Testing of Launch Vehicle FDDR Models

For the safe operation of a complex system like a (manned) launch vehicle, real-time information about the state of the system and potential faults is extremely important. The on-board FDDR (Failure Detection, Diagnostics, and Response) system is a software system to detect and identify failures, provide real-time diagnostics, and to initiate fault recovery and mitigation. The ERIS (Evaluation of Rocket Integrated Subsystems) failure simulation is a unified Matlab/Simulink model of the Ares I Launch Vehicle with modular, hierarchical subsystems and components. With this model, the nominal flight performance characteristics can be studied. Additionally, failures can be injected to see their effects on vehicle state and on vehicle behavior. A comprehensive test and analysis of such a complicated model is virtually impossible. In this paper, we will describe, how parametric testing (PT) can be used to support testing and analysis of the ERIS failure simulation. PT uses a combination of Monte Carlo techniques with n-factor combinatorial exploration to generate a small, yet comprehensive set of parameters for the test runs. For the analysis of the high-dimensional simulation data, we are using multivariate clustering to automatically find structure in this high-dimensional data space. Our tools can generate detailed HTML reports that facilitate the analysis

Instrumentation and Control Needs for Reliable Operation of Lunar Base Surface Nuclear Power Systems

As one of the near-term goals of the President's Vision for Space Exploration, establishment of a multi-person lunar base will require high-endurance power systems which are independent of the sun, and can operate without replenishment for several years. These requirements may be obtained using nuclear power systems specifically designed for use on the lunar surface. While it is envisioned that such a system will generally be supervised by humans, some of the evolutions required maybe semi or fully autonomous. The entire base complement for near-term missions may be less than 10 individuals, most or all of which may not be qualified nuclear plant operators and may be off-base for extended periods thus, the need for power system autonomous operation. Startup, shutdown, and load following operations will require the application of advanced control and health management strategies with an emphasis on robust, supervisory, coordinated control of, for example, the nuclear heat source, energy conversion plant (e.g., Brayton Energy Conversion units), and power management system. Autonomous operation implies that, in addition to being capable of automatic response to disturbance input or load changes, the system is also capable of assessing the status of the integrated plant, determining the risk associated with the possible actions, and making a decision as to the action that optimizes system performance while minimizing risk to the mission. Adapting the control to deviations from design conditions and degradation due to component failures will be essential to ensure base inhabitant safety and mission success. Intelligent decisions will have to be made to choose the right set of sensors to provide the data needed to do condition monitoring and fault detection and isolation because of liftoff weight and space limitations, it will not be possible to have an extensive set of instruments as used for earth-based systems. Advanced instrumentation and control technologies will be needed to enable this critical functionality of autonomous operation. It will be imperative to consider instrumentation and control requirements in parallel to system configuration development so as to identify control-related, as well as integrated system-related, problem areas early to avoid potentially expensive work-arounds . This paper presents an overview of the enabling technologies necessary for the development of reliable, autonomous lunar base nuclear power systems with an emphasis on system architectures and off-the-shelf algorithms rather than hardware. Autonomy needs are presented in the context of a hypothetical lunar base nuclear power system. The scenarios and applications presented are hypothetical in nature, based on information from open-literature sources, and only intended to provoke thought and provide motivation for the use of autonomous, intelligent control and diagnostics

LADEE Preparations for Contingency Operations for the Lunar Orbit Insertion Maneuver

The Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE) spacecraft was launched on September 7, 2013 UTC, and completed its mission on April 17, 2014 UTC with a directed impact to the Lunar Surface. Its primary goals were to examine the lunar atmosphere, measure lunar dust, and to demonstrate high rate laser communications. The mission objectives, much of which can be attributed to careful LADEE mission was a resounding success, achieving all planning and preparation. This paper discusses the specific preparations for fault conditions that could occur during a highly-critical phase of the mission, the Lunar Orbit Insertion (LOI). highly critical phase of the mission

Inversion Method for Early Detection of ARES-1 Case Breach Failure

A document describes research into the problem of detecting a case breach formation at an early stage of a rocket flight. An inversion algorithm for case breach allocation is proposed and analyzed. It is shown how the case breach can be allocated at an early stage of its development by using the rocket sensor data and the output data from the control block of the rocket navigation system. The results are simulated with MATLAB/Simulink software. The efficiency of an inversion algorithm for a case breach location is discussed. The research was devoted to the analysis of the ARES-l flight during the first 120 seconds after the launch and early prediction of case breach failure. During this time, the rocket is propelled by its first-stage Solid Rocket Booster (SRB). If a breach appears in SRB case, the gases escaping through it will produce the (side) thrust directed perpendicular to the rocket axis. The side thrust creates torque influencing the rocket attitude. The ARES-l control system will compensate for the side thrust until it reaches some critical value, after which the flight will be uncontrollable. The objective of this work was to obtain the start time of case breach development and its location using the rocket inertial navigation sensors and GNC data. The algorithm was effective for the detection and location of a breach in an SRB field joint at an early stage of its development

From Diagnosis to Action: An Automated Failure Advisor for Human Deep Space Missions

The major goal of current space system development at NASA is to enable human travel to deep space locations such as Mars and asteroids. At that distance, round trip communication with ground operators may take close to an hour, thus it becomes unfeasible to seek ground operator advice for problems that require immediate attention, either for crew safety or for activities that need to be performed at specific times for the attainment of scientific results. To achieve this goal, major reliance will need to be placed on automation systems capable of aiding the crew in detecting and diagnosing failures, assessing consequences of these failures, and providing guidance in repair activities that may be required. We report here on the most current step in the continuing development of such a system, and that is the addition of a Failure Response Advisor. In simple terms, we have a system in place the Advanced Caution and Warning System (ACAWS) to tell us what happened (failure diagnosis) and what happened because that happened (failure effects). The Failure Response Advisor will tell us what to do about it, how long until something must be done and why its important that something be done and will begin to approach the complex reasoning that is generally required for an optimal approach to automated system health management. This advice is based on the criticality and various timing elements, such as durations of activities and of component repairs, failure effects delay, and other factors. The failure advice is provided to operators (crew and mission controllers) together with the diagnostic and effects information. The operators also have the option to drill down for more information about the failure and the reasons for any suggested priorities

Prognostics for Autonomous Electric-Propulsion Aircraft

An autonomous unmanned aerial system (UAS) needs, during the flight, accurate information about the current failure state of the aircraft and its capabilities in order to safely perform its mission and properly react to contingencies. The flight battery of an electric-propulsion aircraft is its most relevant resource. Model-based prognostics algorithms are used to obtain good estimates of its current state of charge and remaining capacity. However, these algorithms can have a large computational footprint. We present Prognostics-as-a-Service, a hybrid approach combining on-board computation with server-based prognostics on the ground. In this paper, we focus on the role, battery prognostics plays for the safe operation of a highly autonomous aircraft: prognostics for (1) continuous on-board safety monitoring, (2) for UAS operations, and (3) for contingency planning. We present the NASA Autonomous Operating System (AOS) and discuss how the autonomous components closely work together with on-board and server-based ground prognostics systems. We will illustrate the system with case studies on small NASA unmanned aircraft

Model-based System Health Management and Contingency Planning for Autonomous UAS

Safe autonomous operations of an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) requires that the UAS can react to unforeseen circumstances, for example, after a failure has occurred. In this paper we describe a model-based run-time architecture for autonomous on-board diagnosis, system health management, and contingency management. This architecture is being instantiated on top of NASA's Core Flight System (cFS/cFE) as amajor component of the on-board AutonomousOperating System (AOS). We will describe our diagnosis and monitoring components, which continuously provide system health status. Automated reasoning with constraint satisfaction form the core of our decision-making component, which assesses the current situation, aids in failure disambiguation, and constructs a contingency plan to mitigate the failure(s) and allow for a safe end of the mission. We will illustrate our contingency management system with two case studies, one for a fixed-wing aircraft in simulation, and one for an autonomous DJI S1000+ octo-copter

Autonomy Operating System for UAVs: Pilot-in-a-Box

The Autonomy Operating System (AOS) is an open flight software platform with Artificial Intelligence for smart UAVs. It is built to be extendable with new apps, similar to smartphones, to enable an expanding set of missions and capabilities. AOS has as its foundations NASAs core flight executive and core flight software (cFEcFS). Pilot-in-a-Box (PIB) is an expanding collection of interacting AOS apps that provide the knowledge and intelligence onboard a UAV to safely and autonomously fly in the National Air Space, eventually without a remote human ground crew. Longer-term, the goal of PIB is to provide the capability for pilotless air vehicles such as air taxis that will be key for new transportation concepts such as mobility-on-demand. PIB provides the procedural knowledge, situational awareness, and anticipatory planning (thinking ahead of the plane) that comprises pilot competencies. These competencies together with a natural language interface will enable Pilot-in-a-Box to dialogue directly with Air Traffic Management from takeoff through landing. This paper describes the overall AOS architecture, Artificial Intelligence reasoning engines, Pilot-in-a-box competencies, and selected experimental flight tests to date